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A B S T R A C T
This article proposes a new electricity storage business model based on multiple simultaneously
considered revenue streams, which can be attributed to different market activities and players. These
players thus share electricity storage resources and compete to obtain the right to use them in a dynamic
allocation mechanism. It is based on the design of a new periodically organized auction to allocate shared
storage resources through physical storage rights between different market players and accompanying
applications. Through such a ﬂexibility platform owners of ﬂexible resources can commercialize their
ﬂexible capacity over different applications, while market players looking for additional ﬂexibility can
obtain this through a pay-per-use principle and thus not having to make long-term investment
commitments. As such, they can quickly adapt their portfolio according to the market situation.
Alternatively, through such an allocation mechanism players can effectively share storage resources.
Players may be incentivized to participate as they can share the investment cost, mitigate risk, exploit
economies of scale, overcome regulatory barriers, and merge time-varying and player-dependent
ﬂexibility needs. The mechanism allocates the limited storage resources to the most valuable application
for each market-clearing, based on the competing players’ willingness-to-pay. An illustrative case study
is provided in which three players share storage resources that are allocated through a daily auction with
hourly market-clearings.
 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The integration of variable renewable energy sources (RES) is a
major challenge for the operation of the power system. Their
limited controllability and predictability results in an increased
need for power system ﬂexibility, while ﬂexible conventional
power plants currently experience decreasing proﬁtability as a
result of low electricity prices and a limited number of operating
hours [1]. Flexibility is the ability to provide up- and downward
power adjustments to deal with temporary imbalances between
generation and consumption of electric energy [2,3]. This ﬂexibility
can be provided by ﬂexible generation and consumption, and* Corresponding author at: Department of Electrical Engineering, University of
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2352-152X/ 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.electricity storage, but can also be activated in neighboring regions
through interconnection capacity and the further integration of
adjacent markets (Fig. 1). Electricity storage has the ability to
compensate temporary power surpluses and shortages by
decoupling the generation of electric energy from its consumption
over time. The extent of this compensation is limited by its storage
capacity.
Although there is a need for ﬂexibility because of its increasing
demand and decreasing supply, market participants are only
incentivized to integrate new ﬂexible resources if the investment is
proﬁtable. In addition, the value of storage is often underestimated
due to the focus on operation strategies based on only a single
application, usually price arbitrage between off-peak and on-peak
hours. However, determining the true value of electricity storage
will likely require the aggregation of multiple applications while
accounting for the interdependence between potential revenue
streams [4–6]. The value of individual applications cannot simply
be added together, but need to be co-optimized since different
storage services can conﬂict with each other [7].
Fig. 1. Overview of power system ﬂexibility sources.
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based on multiple simultaneously considered revenue streams,
which can be attributed to different activities in the market and
can thus be the focus of different market players. As such, these
market players share electricity storage resources and compete to
use the shared storage resources. The allocation is based on the
design of a periodically organized auction with sequential market-
clearings, in which the right to use storage resources is traded
between different players.
1.1. Electricity storage applications
Electricity storage refers to systems, bidirectionally coupled
with the power system, which buffer energy. This includes both
systems in which the charging and discharging side is physically
located at one location, e.g., pumped-hydro storage plants and
battery storage systems, or at multiple locations, i.e., power-to-gas
systems in combination with a gas turbine. This deﬁnition
distinguishes electricity storage from the broader concept of
energy storage, which may, e.g., also include stock-piling fuel at the
supply side of the power system.1
Historically, electricity storage plants were considered as an
alternative for investing in peak-load generation, by charging
during off-peak and discharging during on-peak moments.
However, due to the liberalization of electricity markets and the
integration of RES, distinct valorization paths for different
applications of storage emerged [8–11]. These can be categorized
in energy, network, and reliability services.
Energy services include arbitrage and portfolio optimization of
market participants. Arbitrage is based on price differences over
time: electricity is bought and stored when the price is low, and is
sold and generated again when the price is higher. Portfolio
optimization is performed at different time scales, i.e., investment,
scheduling, and operation, and covers generation investment
deferral, inter-temporal energy shifting, and capacity ﬁrming,
respectively. Through inter-temporal energy shifting generators
optimize the value of generation by decoupling generation and
physical injection, while consumers optimize the cost of con-
sumption by decoupling consumption and physical withdrawal.
Capacity ﬁrming can indicate the ability to smoothen the
generation or consumption output, resulting in less volatile power
proﬁles, or to follow predetermined output schedules to reduce
imbalanced positions in real-time. Network services include the
provision of frequency control (i.e., primary, secondary, tertiary),21 Power plants may have signiﬁcant fuel reserves, e.g., the natural gas grid with
its storage capabilities for gas-ﬁred power plants, coal piles at classic thermal power
plants, and nuclear fuel at nuclear power plants.
2 In the ENTSO-E synchronous zone operating reserves are categorized into
frequency containment reserves (FCR), frequency restoration reserves (FRR), both
automatic (aFRR) and manual (mFRR), and restoration reserves (RR).voltage support, congestion management, and black-start capabil-
ities to the transmission system operator (TSO). In the future, some
of these will likely be provided to the distribution system operator
(DSO) as well. Reliability services include the provision of reliability
on both the local and system level.
This multitude of applications makes electricity storage plants
an interesting asset for a wide range of market participants.
However, operating a storage plant to provide just one or a few of
these services might not always result in a positive business case;
proﬁtability may require the aggregation of multiple applications.
1.2. Motivation
Although some studies focus on the co-optimization of different
storage applications (e.g., [5,7,12]), most existing work focuses on
only a single application or allocates the available storage
resources a-priori when considering multiple applications, instead
of applying a periodically performed optimization process. In
addition, the sharing and operation of storage resources by
different players has only been studied to a limited extent, except
for the work done by [4]. As such, the contribution of the auction-
based allocation described in this article is that it does not a-priori
deﬁne the applications or even the market player that the storage
resources will serve at a certain moment in time. This can be
accomplished by the development of a centralized platform where
periodical auctions with sequential market-clearings take place to
allocate the right to use (dis)charge power capacities and energy
storage capacity. These auctions can serve both settings where (1)
multiple players share common storage plants and (2) multiple
suppliers of storage resources and prospective consumers meet to
trade physical storage rights. Whereas the presented allocation
mechanism allows to simultaneously include multiple resource
suppliers and players competing for the right to use them, and to
simultaneously consider their offers, the method discussed in [4]
considers a sequential allocation to players which express their
need for ﬂexible resources at different time scales. In addition, the
presented allocation mechanism auctions physical (dis)charge
power rights and storage capacity rights, whereas the allocation in
[4] is based on actual utilization proﬁles.
Market players can have multiple incentives to share, contract,
or offer storage resources by means of a periodically organized
auction. First, this may allow them to exploit economies of scale,
i.e., increasing the plant size at a reduced cost per unit of power and
energy. Second, they can share the investment cost and associated
risk, especially when considering large-scale storage plants. Third,
as ﬂexibility needs vary throughout the year and even throughout
the day, and across market players, they may have different
(possibly complementary) storage utilization patterns, providing
an incentive to share resources.
From a system point of view, there are additional reasons to
share storage resources. First, as storage resources are usually
limited due to geographical requirements, they should be allocated
to the most valuable services at each point in time. Second, due to
the introduced competition to use storage resources strategic
under- or overusage [13] is likely to occur less frequently. Third,
although pumped-hydro storage is currently the most mature
storage technology, rapidly decreasing costs and technological
advancements are making battery storage systems increasingly
competitive [14]. To overcome barriers for such small-scale
storage resources to participate in the market, the development
of a centralized platform allows owners of these resources to offer
ﬂexibility to market players that aggregate them. Finally,
regulatory barriers might prevent storage operators to provide
certain services simultaneously. In the United States storage plants
can either provide market-based or regulated services (e.g.,
congestion management to avoid grid upgrades), but they are
Fig. 2. Illustration of (Generalized) Nash equilibrium problems.
3 A constraint’s dual variable represents the incremental improvement of the
player’s objective value when marginally relaxing the respective constraint, and can
be interpreted as the marginal price of the resource subject to the constraint.
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auction such as the one proposed in this article can overcome this
regulatory barrier by allocating storage rights to different players
to provide either market-based or regulated services.
This decoupling of the ownership of storage resources with its
physical operation has similar characteristics to the treatment of
transmission capacity, as both have the ability to move power, the
former in time while the latter in space. In European electricity
markets cross-border transmission capacity is auctioned explicitly
or implicitly [16,17]. The former indicates that market players can
obtain the right to use interconnector capacity, after which they
can use these capacities to capture price differences in neighboring
markets. In the latter, these capacities are not auctioned to market
players but allocated to the power exchange to include in the
market-clearing algorithm to maximize social welfare. The
allocation mechanism discussed in this article is based on explicit
auctioning, as ﬁrst the right to use storage resources is auctioned,
after which players can use these resources in the electricity
market. Furthermore, Refs. [18,19] consider a situation where the
surplus collected by the system operator or power exchange (i.e.,
storage congestion rent), following a central operation of storage
resources to maximize social welfare, is allocated to players
holding ﬁnancial storage rights. These are based on the design of
ﬁnancial transmission rights [20,21], and thus remunerate storage
investors by either the revenues of the auction of ﬁnancial storage
rights or the value of the storage congestion rent itself. Similar to
the proposed auction-based allocation mechanism, this allows
them to recover the investment cost without participating in the
electricity market themselves.
1.3. Contributions
The main contribution of this article is the presentation of an
alternative approach for electricity storage plants to aggregate
multiple applications. This is based on a new market for ﬂexibility,
namely a periodically organized auction to allocate shared storage
resources through physical storage rights between different
market players and accompanying applications. Through this
allocation mechanism (1) market participants can share storage
resources to exploit economies of scale, reduce the investment
cost, mitigate risk, match complementary ﬂexibility needs, and
overcome regulatory barriers, and (2) owners of ﬂexible resources
can commercialize their ﬂexible capacity over different applica-
tions while market players looking for additional ﬂexibility have
access to these resources on a short-term basis. As such, the latter
do not have to make long-term investment commitments and can
adapt their portfolio according to changing market situations.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses
(Generalized) Nash games, mixed complementarity problems,
and the designed storage allocation mechanism in more detail.
Section 3 illustrates this auction-based allocation through a case
study in which three market players share storage resources, by
providing the mathematical formulation of the players’ individual
optimization problems and resulting market equilibrium problem.
While Section 4 discusses the case study’s results, Section 5
provides the conclusions of this article.
2. Methodology
2.1. (Generalized) Nash equilibrium problems
The interaction between several market players, in which each
player aims to optimize the value of its objective function given the
decisions by all rivals, can be mathematically formulated as an
equilibrium problem. We ﬁrst introduce Nash equilibrium
problems (NEP) [22] before discussing the concept of aGeneralized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) [23]. Assume a
market with a ﬁnite amount of players, in which each player i 2 I
faces the following optimization problem:
max
xi
f iðxi; xiÞ; (1a)
s:t: xi 2 Xi: (1b)
Each player’s vector of decision variables xi, has to be chosen
from its set of feasible strategies Xi, while the vector of decision
variables of its rivals xi is considered as given. A Nash equilibrium
xi is then reached when the following condition holds:
f iðxi ; xiÞ  f iðyi; xiÞ; 8 i 2 I; yi 2 Xi: (2)
This equilibrium means that given the decisions by all rivals, no
player has an incentive to deviate from its chosen strategy. An
implicit assumption of the NEP is that the strategies chosen by the
competing players only affect the players’ objective function and
not their feasible set of strategies. In contrast, in a GNEP this
assumption is relaxed [23–27], as each player’s vector of decision
variables xi has to be chosen from a set of feasible strategies XiðxiÞ
that is affected by the strategies chosen by the competing players.
A Generalized Nash equilibrium xi is then reached when the
following condition holds:
f iðxi ; xiÞ  f iðyi; xiÞ; 8 i 2 I ; yi 2 XiðxiÞ: (3)
The general structure of both a NEP and GNEP, consisting of a set
of interrelated optimization problems, is illustrated in Fig. 2. In a
GNEP, each player’s objective function may be subject to both
individual and shared constraints. While each individual optimi-
zation problem represents the decision process of one player, the
equilibrium problem represents the interactions in a market
environment of multiple interrelated players.
2.2. Mixed complementarity problems
The NEP and GNEP can be solved by formulating the problem as
a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). This is done by deriving
the ﬁrst-order optimality, or Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT), condi-
tions of each player’s optimization problem and solving them
simultaneously. In the MCP formulation, the complementarity
conditions enforce that the inner product of an inequality
constraint and the primal or dual variable3 is zero, and the
nonnegativity of both the inequality constraint and the primal or
dual variable. This means that either the inequality constraint
holds as an equality, i.e., is binding, or the primal or dual variable is
Fig. 3. Illustration of the market-clearing mechanism to allocate storage resources.
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operator ?, which indicates complementarity.
An MCP is thus an array of equalities and inequalities which is
obtained by aggregating all players’ KKT conditions. However,
when tackling a GNEP, aggregating the individual players’ KKT
conditions into an MCP results in a nonsquare system: the shared
constraints are identical for each player, while the associated dual
variables of each involved player may hold different values. This
‘squareness’ issue can be solved by assigning an identical dual
variable for each player to the shared constraint [23], meaning that
each player values the shared resource identically, which leads to a
single ‘price’ for the shared resource [24,25].
This approach can be interpreted as an auctioneer allocating the
shared resource to the players according to the price they are
willing to pay to obtain the right to use it. Their willingness-to-pay
directly relates to the improvement of their objective value from a
marginal relaxation of the shared resource.
2.3. Auction-based allocation of shared storage resources
The shared storage resources’ allocation problem can be
formulated as both a NEP and GNEP. In the former case, the
suppliers of storage resources are modeled explicitly, while the
consumers and suppliers in the market for storage resources
interact by means of market-clearing conditions representing the
auctioneer. This formulation relates to the situation where multiple
suppliers and consumers of storage resources compete in a
centralized market. In the latter case, the suppliers are not modeled
explicitly but are included implicitly through the storage resources’
shared constraints. Through these shared constraints an auctioneer
is assumed to allocate the storage rights over the different players.
This formulation is particularly useful to represent the situation
where multiple market players share the storage resources and
allocate them periodically among each other.
It is well known from [23] that a NEP where the auctioneer is
modeled explicitly yields the same solution as a GNEP where the
dual variables of each player for the shared constraints are
assumed to be identical. If the solution is nonunique, the two
solutions may differ in terms of the primal variables (i.e., operation
decisions), but the objective value (i.e., pay-off) for each player
must be identical. In this article, we use the GNEP formulation to a
case study in Section 3 as it illustrates a case in which three players
share storage resources. For illustrative purposes, the remainder of
the discussion assumes a single storage plant.
In both formulations the auctioneer thus acts as a facilitator
between the supply of shared storage resources (i.e., charge power
Pc,max, discharge power Pd,max, energy storage capacity Emax)4 and a4 Table 1 provides an overview of the symbols for sets, primal variables, dual
variables, and parameters used in this article. Formulas are provided assuming SI or
base units, while input data and results follow typical units in electrical
engineering.number of players jIj which compete to obtain the right to use
them. A periodical auction is organized, in which for each market
period t 2 T the supplier of the storage resources submits supply
bids sct , s
d
t , s
e
t and each market player i 2 I has the opportunity to
submit demand bids dci;t , d
d
i;t , d
e
i;t for each storage resource (Fig. 3,
left). The supplier is assumed to provide a supply bid for each
shared resource equal to its maximum capacity, to be sold at any
price deﬁned by the market. Each player i bids the maximum price
he is willing to pay to obtain the right to use a speciﬁed volume of
each storage resource. This maximum price equals its incremental
pay-off. The auctioneer then aggregates the demand bids for each
storage resource, i.e., the demand curve, and matches them with
each resource’s supply bid, i.e., the supply curve, which results in a
market-clearing for each timestep t (Fig. 3, right). This yields a
cleared volume for the charge power rights pc;maxi;t , discharge power
rights pd;maxi;t , and storage capacity rights e
max
i;t for each player i, and
uniform market-clearing prices mct , m
d
t , m
e
t . In equilibrium, these
prices equal the marginal willingness-to-pay for each respective
resource.
Similar to the case in current electricity markets, the
allocation process may be iterated at different timeframes
(e.g., week-ahead, day-ahead, intra-day, real-time) to allow
players to adjust their obtained physical storage rights, based on
updated market information. In a ﬁrst auction (e.g., day-ahead)
the shared resources are allocated to the different players
according to their willingness-to-pay, which is dependent on
their market expectations and risk aversion, while in a
consecutive allocation closer to real-time (e.g., intra-day) players
can trade and reallocate the obtained resources among each
other: players that contracted too much can offer part of their
obtained rights again to the platform, while players that
contracted too little can bid to obtain additional storage rights.
As is the case in electricity markets, these sequential markets for
storage resources may also allow for arbitrage opportunities as
price spreads can be captured over the different sequential
markets. Arbitrageurs could, e.g., obtain additional storage rights
at the day-ahead stage to afterwards sell in the intra-day market
to other players if they expect the intra-day price to clear at a
higher price. Alternatively, players could, e.g., postpone the
reservation of physical storage rights in the day-ahead market to
the intra-day market if they expect the intra-day market to clear
at a lower price. Although the value of this arbitrage is related to
the presence of price spreads, it also depends on the effect of
additional/fewer requested storage rights on prices, as arbitrage
may reduce price spreads by increasing low prices when
requesting additional storage rights and decreasing high prices
when requesting fewer storage rights.
3. Case study
To illustrate the presented auction-based allocation mecha-
nism, a case study is shown for a daily auction with hourly
Table 1
Table of symbols.
Type Symbol Quantity Unit (SI) Typical unit
Sets h 2 H Time steps – –
i 2 I Players – –
t 2 T Time stamps – –
Primal variables ei,h Stored energy J MWh
emaxi ,e
max
i;h ,e
max
i;t Storage capacity rights J MWh
pci;h Charge power W MW
pc;maxi ,p
c;max
i;h
,pc;maxi;t Charge power rights W MW
pdi;h Discharge power W MW
pd;maxi ,p
d;max
i;h
,pd;maxi;t Discharge power rights W MW
pgi;h Power generation W MW
pli;h Power curtailment W MW
bi Cost s/s s/year
pi Proﬁt s/s s/year
popi Operating proﬁt s/s s/year
Dual variables mci;h Dual to charge power constraints s/s/W s/h/MW
mch ,m
c
t Price of charge power rights s/s/W s/h/MW
mc Price of charge power rights s/s/W s/day/MW
mdi;h Dual to discharge power constraints s/s/W s/h/MW
mdh ,m
d
t Price of discharge power rights s/s/W s/h/MW
md Price of discharge power rights s/s/W s/day/MW
mei;h Dual to storage capacity constraints s/s/J s/h/MWh
meh ,m
e
t Price of storage capacity rights s/s/J s/h/MWh
me Price of storage capacity rights s/s/J s/day/MWh
gei;h Dual to energy buffer constraints s/s/J s/h/MWh
gg
i;h
Dual to available renewable power constraints s/s/W s/h/MW
g li;h Dual to imbalanced position constraints s/s/W s/h/MW
tci;h Dual to charge power rights constraints s/s/W s/h/MW
tdi;h Dual to discharge power rights constraints s/s/W s/h/MW
tei;h Dual to storage capacity rights constraints s/s/J s/h/MWh
Parameters Emax Storage capacity J MWh
Gp,h Available renewable power W MW
Lmaxr Imbalanced position upper bound W MW
Pc,max Charge power rating W MW
Pd,max Discharge power rating W MW
Th Time step length s h
hc,hd (Dis)charge efﬁciency % %
ldah Day-ahead price s/J s/MWh
lrth Real-time imbalance price s/J s/MWh
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constrained storage resources, i.e., I ¼ fa; p; rg, with index a
representing a player arbitraging day-ahead market prices,
index p a player focusing on portfolio management, and index r
a player that aims to use storage resources to capture imbalance
price differences in the real-time market. First, the individual
optimization problems are presented as if electricity storage
resources would be readily available to them. Second, we
discuss which changes have to take place in order for the players
to share storage resources and compete in an auction-based
allocation mechanism, i.e., equilibrium problem. Third, the MCP
formulation of the equilibrium problem is discussed while it is
provided in full in Appendix A.
The model formulations of the provided case study include
discretized hourly time periods h 2 H, with jHj ¼ 24 and Th
representing the length of one time period, i.e., one hour. Variables
in parentheses denote the dual variables of the respective
constraints. In addition, all players are assumed to be price-takers
with perfect foresight for the next optimization horizon, i.e., the
next day in this case study. The storage plant is assumed to have
sufﬁciently fast ramp rates for the considered hourly time
resolution, with no restrictions regarding simultaneous charge
and discharge actions, and a sufﬁciently large cycle-life such that
its impact on the operation is negligible. These storage plant
assumptions might serve to model typical pumped-hydro storage
plants.3.1. Individual optimization problems
First a storage operator is considered that aims to capture
price differences in the day-ahead market. This player is
indicated by index a, and its optimization problem, in which
the pay-off is maximized over a time horizon jHjTh, reads as
follows:
max
ea;h ;p
c
a;h
;pd
a;h
X
h 2 H
ldah ½Thðpda;hpca;hÞ=ðjHjThÞ; (4a)
ea;h ¼ ea;h1 þ Thðpca;hhcpda;h=hdÞ; ðgea;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (4b)
pca;hPc;max; ðmca;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (4c)
pda;hPd;max; ðmda;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (4d)
ea;hEmax; ðmea;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (4e)
ea;h; p
c
a;h; p
d
a;h 2 Rþ; h 2 N; 8 h 2 H
with pca;h the charge power, p
d
a;h the discharge power, ea,h the
stored energy, ldah the day-ahead market price, h
c the charge
efﬁciency, and hd the discharge efﬁciency. Constraint (4b)
expresses the intertemporal character of electricity storage,
T. Brijs et al. / Journal of Energywhile (4c)–(4e) represent capacity bounds on the electricity
storage resources.
Next, a RES generator operating a portfolio of both wind and
photovoltaic (PV) capacity is considered. This player uses storage
resources to increase the market value of its RES generation. This
can be done by either directly selling its RES power output to the
market or temporarily storing it during low price periods. This
application of electricity storage results from the fact that periods
experiencing high RES generation often coincide with lower price
periods [1]. This player is indicated by index p, and its optimization
problem is:
max
ep;h; p
c
p;h; p
d
p;h;
pgp;h; p
l
p;h
X
h 2 H
ldah ½Thðpgp;h þ pdp;hÞ=ðjHjThÞ; (5a)
pcp;h þ pgp;h þ plp;h ¼ Gp;h; ðggp;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (5b)
ep;h ¼ ep;h1 þ Thðpcp;hhcpdp;h=hdÞ; ðgep;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (5c)
pcp;hPc;max; ðmcp;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (5d)
pdp;hPd;max; ðmdp;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (5e)
ep;hEmax; ðmep;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (5f)
ep;h; p
c
p;h; p
d
p;h; p
g
p;h; p
l
p;h 2 Rþ; h 2 N; 8 h 2 H
with Gp,h the available RES power output, p
g
p;h the RES output
directly sold to the market, and plp;h the curtailed RES output.
Constraint (5b) denotes that the RES power output can either be
stored, sold, or curtailed.
Unforeseen imbalances between generation and consumption
are dealt with in real-time on the balancing market, which is
coordinated by the TSO. At the procurement side of the balancing
market the TSO contracts and activates reserve capacity to cover
system imbalances, while at the settlement side of the balancing
market the TSO settles individual imbalanced positions of market
participants by means of an imbalance price that is based on the
activation cost of reserves [1]. The third considered player is an
arbitrageur that is active on the settlement side of the real-time
balancing market to capture imbalance price differences over time.
As the real-time balancing market is characterized by a small
volume compared to the day-ahead market, the imbalanced
positions this player can take while not diminishing the expected
price spreads are assumed to be bounded by Lmaxr (6b). As such, the
price-taking assumption assumed in this illustrative case study
holds. Although the balancing market is usually characterized by
quarter-hourly or semi-hourly market periods, for illustrative
purposes hourly market periods are assumed. This player is
indicated by index r, and its optimization problem reads as follows:
max
er;h;p
c
r;h
;pd
r;h
X
h 2 H
lrth ½Thðpdr;hpcr;hÞ=ðjHjThÞ; (6a)
pcr;h þ pdr;hLmaxr ; ðg lr;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (6b)
er;h ¼ er;h1 þ Thðpcr;hhcpdr;h=hdÞ; ðger;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (6c)
pcr;hPc;max; ðmcr;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (6d)pdr;hPd;max; ðmdr;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (6e)
er;hEmax; ðmer;hÞ; 8 h 2 H; (6f)
er;h; p
c
r;h; p
d
r;h 2 Rþ; h 2 N; 8 h 2 H
with lrth the real-time imbalance price.
3.2. Generalized Nash equilibrium problem
When formulating the presented optimization problems as a
GNEP, two changes take place. First, as they compete for the shared
electricity storage resources, the constraints representing the
limited charge power (4c), (5d), (6d), discharge power (4d), (5e),
(6e), and energy storage capacity (4e), (5f), (6f) are replaced by:
pci;hpc;maxi;h ; ðtci;hÞ; 8 i 2 I; h 2 H; (7a)
pdi;hpd;maxi;h ; ðtdi;hÞ; 8 i 2 I; h 2 H; (7b)
ei;hemaxi;h ; ðtei;hÞ; 8 i 2 I; h 2 H; (7c)
with pc;maxi;h , p
d;max
i;h , and e
max
i;h the allocated charge power rights,
discharge power rights, and storage capacity rights, respectively.
These physical rights are bounded by the supplied storage
resources, which are assumed to equal the installed (dis)charge
power rating and energy storage capacity in this illustrative case
study:
X
i 2 I
pc;maxi;h Pc;max; ðmchÞ; 8 h 2 H; (8a)
X
i 2 I
pd;maxi;h Pd;max; ðmdhÞ; 8 h 2 H; (8b)
X
i 2 I
emaxi;h Emax; ðmehÞ; 8 h 2 H: (8c)
Alternatively, when considering a centralized market for
storage resources rather than a situation where players share
them, the supply is characterized by index h as well as it will be
time-varying. Second, a cost term is subtracted ex-post from
each player’s objective value, since the right to use the limited
storage resources is now allocated through an auction instead of
being readily available to them. The uniform price of the shared
resources mch (8a), m
d
h (8b), m
e
h (8c) at each hourly market-
clearing is determined by the willingness-to-pay of the players’
marginally cleared demand bid to obtain the right to use
them. The ex-post calculation of the proﬁt pi as opposed to
the operating proﬁt popi is done by considering the objective
value resulting from (4a), (5a), (6a) and subtracting a cost
term bi:
bi ¼
X
h 2 H
ðpc;maxi;h mch þ pd;maxi;h mdh þ emaxi;h mehÞ; 8 i 2 I; (9a)
popi bi ¼ pi; 8 i 2 I: (9b)
The MCP comprised of each player’s KKT conditions and the
shared constraints is solved in GAMS using the PATH solver [28],
and is provided in Appendix A for both a daily auction with hourly
market-clearings, and a less dynamic periodically organized
(e.g., daily, weekly) auction including a single market-clearing,
i.e., allocation, for each of the shared resources for the entire period
(e.g., day, week). Since the considered optimization problems are
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Table 2
Table of input parameters.
Emax 200 MWh Lmaxc 25 MW P
d,max 50 MW hc 86.6%
Gmaxp 75 MW + 75 MW P
c,max 50 MW Th 1 h hd 86.6%
Table 3
Yearly operating proﬁt, cost to obtain storage rights, and proﬁt, 2014.
Daily auctions with hourly allocations Daily auctions with daily allocations
Operating proﬁt Cost Proﬁt Operating proﬁt Cost Proﬁt
popi bi pi p
op
i bi pi
[Ms/year] [Ms/year] [Ms/year] [Ms/year] [Ms/year] [Ms/year]
Player a 0.445 0.445 0.000 0.365 0.365 0.000
Player p 0.369 0.336 0.033 0.230 0.197 0.033
Player r 1.934 0.367 1.567 1.958 0.584 1.374
P
i 2 I 2.748 1.148 1.600 2.553 1.146 1.407
Fig. 4. Total and individual operating proﬁt for different allocations of the shared
storage resources, 2014.
T. Brijs et al. / Journal of Energy Storage 7 (2016) 82–9288convex and the players only face linear constraints, the KKT
conditions are both necessary (i.e., an optimal solution satisﬁes the
KKT conditions) and sufﬁcient (i.e., each KKT point is an optimal
solution) [27].
4. Results
The Belgian day-ahead market price [29], real-time imbalance
price [30], and RES generation proﬁles [30] for 2014 are used for
the illustrative case study. The hourly imbalance price lrth is
calculated as the average of the four quarter-hourly imbalance
prices in hour h. The RES portfolio of player p is assumed to consist
of both PV systems and offshore wind turbines, both accounting for
50% of the portfolio. The time-varying available RES power output
Gp,h is determined by multiplying the hourly availability of the
respective sources by the installed capacity Gmaxp . The storage plant
characteristics used for the case study, along with other input data,
are displayed in Table 2.
Fig. 4 shows the individual operating proﬁt popi and total
operating proﬁt
P
i 2 Ip
op
i for 2014 as a result of the use of storage
resources5 for different allocations, either ﬁxed a-priori deﬁned
allocations (i.e., columns 1–4) or allocations resulting from the5 This means that for player p the value that would have been realized without
use of the storage resources due to the RES generation is subtracted.proposed allocation mechanism (i.e., columns 5 and 6). In the ﬁrst
three columns, popi is shown for the case where the players are each
allocated 100% of the storage resources. Column four indicates popi
in case each player is awarded a ﬁxed share equal to one-third of
the storage resources for the entire year. Since the players are
assumed to be price-takers in their respective markets (i.e., day-
ahead electricity and real-time balancing market), one may expect
that popi is equal to one-third of p
op
i following a 100% allocation to
the respective player. Although this is the case for player a, this is
not the case for player p (42.5%) and player r (61.5%) as their
actions are limited by Gp,h and Lmaxr in the provided case study.
Column ﬁve shows popi when assuming a daily organized auction
with a single market-clearing, i.e., daily allocated (dis)charge
power and storage capacity rights, while column six is based on a
daily organized auction with hourly market-clearings. Fig. 4 shows
that the auction-based allocations lead to a higher total realized
operating proﬁt
P
i 2 Ip
op
i , with shorter time frames for the market-
clearings performing better. The latter ensures that the limited
storage resources are allocated to the most valuable services at
each point in time.
Table 3 shows popi , bi, and pi for the different players. The
revenue collected through the auctioning of the (dis)charge power
and storage capacity rights is indicated by
P
i 2 Ibi. The price of an
auctioned right (i.e., mch, m
d
h , m
e
h for hourly allocations and m
c, md, me
for single allocations per auction) only takes on a nonzero value
when the inequality constraint representing the limited availabili-
ty of the storage resource subject to the constraint is binding (i.e.,
(A.4a)–(A.4c) for hourly allocations and (A.8a)–(A.8c) for single
allocations per auction). In case the price is nonzero, it takes on the
willingness-to-pay of the demand bid of the marginally cleared
player for the respective resource. As such, the zero proﬁt pd and
close-to-zero proﬁt pp indicate that when these players’ bids to
obtain storage rights are accepted they represent the marginally
cleared bids. This is similar to the situation in electricity
markets, where the player of the marginally cleared demand bid
pays as much as he values the consumption of electric power
during that market period. Contrarily, the positive proﬁt pr
shows that its bids to obtain storage rights not always represent
the marginally cleared bid. This can be explained by the large
price spreads at the real-time market compared to the day-
ahead market, through which player r values the use of storage
resources higher, and because the inequality constraints are not
binding when he is the only player that contracts storage
resources as its (dis)charge actions are limited by Lmaxr . In the
former case player r pays the lower willingness-to-pay of one of
the other cleared players, while in the latter case the price of the
right of the storage resource subject to the constraint is zero.
Fig. 5. Allocation of physical storage rights in a daily auction with daily (a), (c), (e), and hourly (b), (d), (f) market-clearings, 2014.
T. Brijs et al. / Journal of Energy Storage 7 (2016) 82–92 89Contrary to this illustrative case study, as more players
participate in such an auction, and more applications are
considered, these situations will occur less frequently. As such,
the revenue collected through the auctioning of storage rights
will converge to the total captured value in the electricity
market more closely.
Fig. 5 illustrates the allocation of the auctioned (dis)charge
power and storage capacity rights for a daily auction with daily (a, c
and e) and hourly (b, d and f) market-clearings for 2014. As for
price-taking players with perfect foresight the overall daily value
of storage resources is likely to be higher for arbitraging real-time
imbalance prices than arbitraging day-ahead electricity prices, due
to the larger and more frequent price spreads, player a and player p
do not often get the opportunity to use more than 25 MW in the
daily allocation case. However, for some hours of the day they
might actually have a higher willingness-to-pay and thus the
storage resources would be valorized at a higher value. Therefore,
when using more frequent market-clearings (i.e., with shorter
durations), the storage resources are allocated more efﬁciently to
the time-varying most valuable services, resulting in a higher total
storage value.5. Conclusions
Electricity storage has the ability to compensate temporary
power surpluses and shortages by decoupling the generation of
electric energy from its consumption over time, thereby meeting
increased ﬂexibility needs. However, market participants are only
incentivized to invest in new ﬂexible resources when the
investment is proﬁtable. As this may not be the case when only
considering a single or a few storage services, maximizing the
value of electricity storage requires the aggregation of multiple
value streams in a single operating strategy.
As such, this article proposes a new storage business model
based on multiple simultaneously considered revenue streams, in
which the applications or even the player that the storage
resources will serve at a certain moment in time are not
predeﬁned. This can be accomplished by the development of a
platform where periodical auctions with sequential market-
clearings take place to allocate physical storage rights to use
(dis)charge power capacities and energy storage capacity. These
auctions allow storage owners to commercialize their resources
over different applications, while players looking for additional
T. Brijs et al. / Journal of Energ90ﬂexibility can obtain this on a short-term basis. Alternatively,
through such an allocation mechanism players can effectively
share storage resources. The mechanism allocates the resources to
the most valuable application for each market-clearing, based on
the players’ willingness-to-pay, which directly relates to the
improvement of their objective value from a marginal improve-
ment of the respective storage resource.
Players may be incentivized to participate in such a mechanism
to share the investment cost, mitigate the associated risk, exploit
economies of scale, overcome regulatory barriers, and merge time-
varying and player-dependent ﬂexibility needs. In addition, this
may include positive effects for the system as well, as limited
storage resources are allocated to the most valuable services at
each point in time and the strategic operation of storage resources
is likely to occur less frequently due to the introduced competition.
Future work includes the comparison of the explicit auctioning
of storage resources through physical storage rights to a
centralized operation of storage with implicit auctioning and to
ﬁnancial storage rights. In addition, future research includes the
analysis of different design parameters (e.g., lead times between
the auction and physical delivery, allocation horizon), as well as
the accommodation of ﬂexible consumption processes in this
ﬂexibility platform because of the similarities with electricity
storage plants (e.g., limited duration).
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Appendix A
First the MCP formulation for a periodically organized auction
with hourly market-clearings for the shared storage resources is
presented. The KKT conditions of player a are (A.1a)–(A.1j), while
those of player p are (A.2a)–(A.2m), and ﬁnally the KKT conditions
of player r are (A.3a)–(A.3k). The shared constraints are repre-
sented by (A.4a)–(A.4c) in the MCP formulation:
0ldah =jHj þ Thgea;hhc þ tca;h ? pca;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.1a)
0ldah =jHjThgea;h=hd þ tda;h ? pda;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.1b)
0gea;h þ gea;hþ1 þ tea;h ? ea;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.1c)
0tca;h þ mch ? pc;maxa;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.1d)
0tda;h þ mdh ? pd;maxa;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.1e)
0tea;h þ meh ? emaxa;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.1f)
0 ¼ ea;h þ ea;h1 þ Thðpca;hhcpda;h=hdÞ ;
gea;h 2 R; 8 h 2 H;
(A.1g)
0pc;maxa;h pca;h ? tca;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.1h)0pd;maxa;h pda;h ? tda;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.1i)
0emaxa;h ea;h ? tea;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.1j)
0ggp;h þ Thgep;hhc þ tcp;h ? pcp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2a)
0ldah =jHjThgep;h=hd þ tdp;h ? pdp;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2b)
0gep;h þ gep;hþ1 þ tep;h ? ep;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2c)
0ldah =jHj þ ggp;h ? pgp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2d)
0ggp;h ? plp;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2e)
0tcp;h þ mch ? pc;maxp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2f)
0tdp;h þ mdh ? pd;maxp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2g)
0tep;h þ meh ? emaxp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2h)
0 ¼ Gp;h þ pcp;h þ pgp;h þ plp;h ; ggp;h 2 R; 8 h 2 H; (A.2i)
0 ¼ ep;h þ ep;h1 þ Thðpcp;hhcpdp;h=hdÞ ;
gep;h 2 R; 8 h 2 H;
(A.2j)
0pc;maxp;h pcp;h ? tcp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2k)
0pd;maxp;h pdp;h ? tdp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2l)
0emaxp;h ep;h ? tep;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.2m)
0lrth =jHj þ Thger;hhc þ g lr;h þ tcr;h ? pcr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3a)
0ldah =jHjThger;h=hd þ g lr;h þ tdr;h ? pdr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3b)
0ger;h þ ger;hþ1 þ ter;h ? er;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3c)
0tcr;h þ mch ? pc;maxr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3d)
0tdr;h þ mdh ? pd;maxr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3e)
0ter;h þ meh ? emaxr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3f)
0Lmaxr pcr;hpdr;h ? g lr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3g)
0 ¼ er;h þ er;h1 þ Thðpcr;hhcpdr;h=hdÞ ;
ger;h 2 R; 8 h 2 H;
(A.3h)
0pc;maxr;h pcr;h ? tcr;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3i)
0pd;maxr;h pdr;h ? tdr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3j)
0emaxr;h er;h ? ter;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.3k)
0Pc;maxpc;maxa;h pc;maxp;h pc;maxr;h ? mch 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.4a)
0Pd;maxpd;maxa;h pd;maxp;h pd;maxr;h ? mdh  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.4b)
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nergy0Emaxemaxa;h emaxp;h emaxr;h ? meh 0; 8 h 2 H: (A.4c)
Second the MCP formulation for a less dynamic periodically
organized auction (e.g., daily, weekly, monthly) including a single
market-clearing, i.e., allocation, for each of the shared resources for
the entire period (e.g., day, week, month) is presented. In this case
the KKT conditions of player a are (A.5a)–(A.5j), of player p are
(A.6a)–(A.6m), and ﬁnally of player r are (A.7a)–(A.7k). The shared
constraints are included through (A.8a)–(A.8c) in the MCP
formulation:
0ldah =jHj þ Thgea;hhc þ tca;h ? pca;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.5a)
0ldah =jHjThgea;h=hd þ tda;h ? pda;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.5b)
0gea;h þ gea;hþ1 þ tea;h ? ea;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.5c)
0
X
h 2 H
ðtca;hÞ þ mc ? pc;maxa  0; (A.5d)
0
X
h 2 H
ðtda;hÞ þ md ? pd;maxa  0; (A.5e)
0
X
h 2 H
ðtea;hÞ þ me ? emaxa  0; (A.5f)
0 ¼ ea;h þ ea;h1 þ Thðpca;hhcpda;h=hdÞ ;
gea;h 2 R; 8 h 2 H;
(A.5g)
0pc;maxa pca;h ? tca;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.5h)
0pd;maxa pda;h ? tda;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.5i)
0emaxa ea;h ? tea;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.5j)
0ggp;h þ Thgep;hhc þ tcp;h ? pcp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.6a)
0ldah =jHjThgep;h=hd þ tdp;h ? pdp;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.6b)
0gep;h þ gep;hþ1 þ tep;h ? ep;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.6c)
0ldah =jHj þ ggp;h ? pgp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.6d)
0ggp;h ? plp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.6e)
0
X
h 2 H
ðtcp;hÞ þ mc ? pc;maxp  0; (A.6f)
0
X
h 2 H
ðtdp;hÞ þ md ? pd;maxp  0; (A.6g)
0
X
h 2 H
ðtep;hÞ þ me ? emaxp  0; (A.6h)
0 ¼ Gp;h þ pcp;h þ pgp;h þ plp;h ; ggp;h 2 R; 8 h 2 H; (A.6i)
0 ¼ ep;h þ ep;h1 þ Thðpcp;hhcpdp;h=hdÞ ;
gep;h 2 R; 8 h 2 H;
(A.6j)
0pc;maxp pcp;h ? tcp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.6k)
T. Brijs et al. / Journal of E0pd;maxp pdp;h ? tdp;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.6l)
0emaxp ep;h ? tep;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.6m)
0lrth =jHj þ Thger;hhc þ g lr;h þ tcr;h ? pcr;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.7a)
0lrth =jHjThger;h=hd þ g lr;h þ tdr;h ? pdr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.7b)
0ger;h þ ger;hþ1 þ ter;h ? er;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.7c)
0
X
h 2 H
ðtcr;hÞ þ mc ? pc;maxr  0; (A.7d)
0
X
h 2 H
ðtdr;hÞ þ md ? pd;maxr  0; (A.7e)
0
X
h 2 H
ðter;hÞ þ me ? emaxr  0; (A.7f)
0Lmaxr pcr;hpdr;h ? g lr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.7g)
0 ¼ er;h þ er;h1 þ Thðpcr;hhcpdr;h=hdÞ ;
ger;h 2 R; 8 h 2 H;
(A.7h)
0pc;maxr pcr;h ? tcr;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.7i)
0pd;maxr pdr;h ? tdr;h 0; 8 h 2 H; (A.7j)
0emaxr er;h ? ter;h  0; 8 h 2 H; (A.7k)
0Pc;maxpc;maxa pc;maxp pc;maxr ? mc  0; (A.8a)
0Pd;maxpd;maxa pd;maxp pd;maxr ? md 0; (A.8b)
0Emaxemaxa emaxp emaxr ? me  0: (A.8c)
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